Across the length and breadth of the Continent, countries such as Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali have either played host to a peacekeeping, peacebuilding or a political mission to address complex and rapidly-evolving dire security situations. Over the last two decades, the UN Security Council has overseen the drawdown or closure of multiple peacekeeping operations across Africa, sometimes in fragile or volatile settings. Transitions from missions in Darfur, Sudan to Mali, and recent drawdowns in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Western Sahara have raised pertinent questions about what follows once the UN peacekeepers leave. The structural obstacle with most UN transitions is the often sidelining of African regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), despite their crucial role in supporting regional stability. When their insights and capabilities are sidelined, transitions risk becoming strategic templates, detached from the realities on the ground, invariably undermining sustainable peacebuilding efforts.
Why should this concern us?
When working well, UN peace operations help to protect civilians, reduce violence, strengthen institutions, and create the political space conducive for dialogue and negotiation to thrive. However, when these missions end, whether designed (in the case of Liberia) or rushed (in the case of Mali), they leave behind complex political, security, humanitarian and environmental challenges. Regional actors such as the African Union and its subregional arrangements continue to play several roles such as facilitating dialogue and mediation, prompt support and response to conflicts, enforcing peace agreement and building capacities to complement the efforts of the United Nations. In most of such instances, these regional actors act as crucial first responders, creating conditions for broader international involvement. In most instances, regional organizations are framed as supporting actors, strategically situated in managing the peacekeeping exit, given their proximity to the conflict, their contextual knowledge and their overarching interest in maintaining order. Arguably, they often maintain stronger political relationships, enjoy greater legitimacy with local actors, and have more sustained engagement than the UN, which operates under fixed mandates.
Transitions go beyond administrative or technical exercises. They are inherently political and require inclusive engagement, careful negotiation, and sustained commitment. In April 2019, the UN Secretary-General issued a directive stressing the need for clear and unambiguous transition calendars to guide mission drawdowns and broader UN reconfiguration efforts.[1] The UN, following a period of institutional introspection had identified fundamental institutional and structural gaps in transitions. All too often, it seems that limited effort is directed towards inclusive and harmonized transition planning. While each regional and international actor contributed important resources and expertise to stabilization efforts, their actions frequently lacked alignment around a unified political framework or shared strategic vision. Interventions were too often piecemeal, focusing principally on managing immediate risks rather than fostering comprehensive, long-term solutions.
Exclusion carries weighty implications for long-term outcomes
First, ignoring regional actors from the core planning of transitions weakens the political legitimacy of the process. For example, during the drawdown of the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the insignificant participation of ECOWAS and the AU in crucial strategic decision-making planning created the impression that the process was externally imposed and disconnected from the region’s political realities. This development affected diplomatic efforts and truncated the capacity of regional organizations to effectively contribute to stabilization after the UN scaled down its presence. Moreover, the lack of meaningful engagement and coordination likely contributed to the strained relationship that subsequently developed between the Malian authorities and ECOWAS. The perception of external imposition and marginalization of regional actors not only weakened trust but also complicated collaborative efforts, undermining the potential for sustained peace and regional cooperation during a critical transition period.
Second, maintaining momentum in peacebuilding becomes increasingly challenging. Ordinarily, it is expected that regional organizations, through their good political offices and mediation efforts, will continue their engagement after UN drawdowns. But when excluded from planning, these efforts risk being fragmented and uncoordinated, hampering alignment between post-UN peacebuilding and regional security frameworks. During the drawdown of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) between 2016 and 2017, ECOWAS and the AU were not fully integrated early into the transition process, thereby limiting their systematic inclusion in strategic planning towards a smooth continuity in post-UN peacebuilding. This disparity complicated efforts to consolidate security sector reforms and delayed harmonization of early warning systems
Third, sidelining regional actors overlooks their steadily expanding capabilities and evolving mandates in Africa’s peace and security framework. Over the past twenty years, both the AU and ECOWAS have significantly strengthened their institutional capacity for early warning, mediation, electoral monitoring, and deployment of peace enforcement missions. However, despite this increased sophistication, UN transitions often treat these organizations as peripheral rather than central partners. In Mali, for instance, the abrupt UN withdrawal in 2023 took place with minimal coordination with either the AU or ECOWAS, even though these bodies have been deeply engaged on the ground. This lack of collaboration resulted in a fragmented transition process, gaps in political engagement and security monitoring, and ultimately weak continuity of support for Malian authorities. In contrast, the transition in Liberia, following the conclusion of UNMIL, offers a more positive example. The close, proactive involvement of ECOWAS in post-mission stabilization played a critical role in maintaining political engagement, ensuring electoral integrity, and helping to anchor peace despite ongoing fragility. These contrasting cases underscore a key lesson when regional organizations are considered full partners from the onset.
What would an improved approach entail?
Transition strategies must be developed jointly with regional organizations from the onset, not as afterthoughts. There should be shared analyses, agreed benchmarks for transition readiness, and coordinated political engagement. The 2017 AU-UN Framework for Enhanced Partnership provides a foundation for such collaboration but requires consistent operationalization in transition contexts. Additionally, resource sharing needs enhancement. UN missions command far greater financial and logistical resources than regional bodies. As UN presences shrink, funding and technical support should increase to strengthen regional capacities. Lastly, high-level coordination among UN and AU officials is needed, especially where transitions involve significant political risks. This requires sustained dialogue across New York, Addis Ababa, and regional capitals, not just efforts at the field level.
As more UN missions conclude due to budget constraints, host government preferences, or shifting geopolitical priorities, effective transition planning becomes even more vital. Without embedding regional organizations centrally, there is a genuine risk that transitions will be perceived not as progress but as abandonment.
Dr. Fiifi Edu-Afful is a Senior Researcher at UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, where he leads research on preventing armed conflict and armed violence.
[1] UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Planning Directive for the Development of Consistent and Coherent UN Transition Processes, In Line with Executive Committee Decision 2018/38, February 25, 2019 (internal document).
